Dear NASA

I see that, according to this you are falling back into your same old safety habits. I suppose that hard lessons are hard to learn on the Cape and in Houston. However, when we lost the Apollo 1 crew, we learned something. Too bad the same can't be said about the shuttle launches.

I think it's high time you reread this document. It shouldn't be too hard for you to find, since it's on your own website. You may remember that accident involving the Challenger. You may also remember that a huge factor in that accident, as with the Columbia, was your very own culture. Do not fall into that trap again.

What you do is important, as if we do not push boudneries, human kind will never move beyond its own shores. If we did not push our boundaries, I would not be sitting here in the middle of North America today. In fact, I wouldn't exist because my Irish ancestors and my German ancestors never would have met. But, thanks to the adventurous natures of many souls, I exist over the transom of time.

The late Dr. Feynman speaks wisely. I suggest you listen to him. His words went largely unnoticed in 1986, perhaps 19 years later will be different:

"Let us make recommendations to ensure that NASA officials deal in a
world of reality in understanding technological weaknesses and
imperfections well enough to be actively trying to eliminate
them. They must live in reality in comparing the costs and utility of
the Shuttle to other methods of entering space. And they must be
realistic in making contracts, in estimating costs, and the difficulty
of the projects. Only realistic flight schedules should be proposed,
schedules that have a reasonable chance of being met. If in this way
the government would not support them, then so be it. NASA owes it to
the citizens from whom it asks support to be frank, honest, and
informative, so that these citizens can make the wisest decisions for
the use of their limited resources.

"For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over
public relations, for nature cannot be fooled."

Dr. Richard P. Feynman, Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Appendix F -- February 3, 1986